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NOTES
The Supreme Court Attacks the Family Trust
The most successful device for the avoidance of the ever-increasing
burden of inheritance taxation has been the trust. Once the pampered
favorite of the courts, it has come to be regarded with suspicion where
taxation is the issue, since the inevitable result of the creation of a trust is
to reduce the amount of the estate or the income of the taxpayer who has
created it. This suspicion is heightened when the settlor retains some sort
of control over the trust. The enactment that has gone the furthest of all
the acts of Congress in its war on this type of tax avoidance is section
302 (d) of the Act of 1926,1 which provides that there shall be included

in the gross estate of the decedent any property of which the decedent "had
made a transfer by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was
subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a
power, either by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any person, to
alter, amend, or revoke..
.
" 2
Considerable speculation arose as to
whether the Supreme Court would interpret this literally. 3 The case of
Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. 4 has provided the answer.
In 193o decedent established a trust in which she reserved the power to
revoke in conjunction with the trustee and a beneficiary, the income to be
paid to the settlor during her life. The beneficiary survived the settlor,
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the trust as part of the
estate of the decedent under section 302 (d). The Board of Tax Appeals
held that the section was inapplicable, 5 and the Circuit Court of Appeals of
the Second Circuit affirmed 6 on the ground that Congress had not intended
to tax transfers by which the settlor had relinquished control so completely.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed, four justices
dissenting. 7 It was insisted on behalf of the taxpayer that "any person"
should be interpreted to mean "any person not a beneficiary", and that otherwise interpreted the statute would be unconstitutional because so arbitrary
and capricious as to contravene the provisions of the Fifth Amendment. The
Court rejected both contentions.
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE

The Supreme Court determined, long before the inclusion of any provisions for taxation of revocable trusts in the Revenue Acts, that a sole
I. 44 STAT. 71 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §411 (d) (1935). This section was substantially
unchanged from the Act of 1924, 43 STAT. 304 (1924).
2. Italics added.
3. See Sutter and Owen, Federal Taxation of Settlors of Trusts (1935) 33 MIcH. L.
REv. 1169; Ryan, Taxation of Donative Transfers Effective at Death (1933) 19 VA. L.
REv. 761, 783, 784; Lowndes, The Constitutionalityof the FederalEstate Tax (1933) 20 VA.
L. REV. 141, 16o; Surrey and Aronson, Inter Vivos Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax
(1932) 32 Cor- L. REv. 1332, 1357; Leaphart, The Use of the Trust to Escape the Imposition
of Federal Income and Estate Taxes (193o) 15 CORN. L. Q. 587, 603.
4. 8o L. ed. I (1935), rehearing denied, Dec. 9, 1935.
5. 29 B. T. A. 1141 (1934).

6. 74 F. (2d) 242 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).

7. Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler dissented.
(400)
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power of revocation in the settlor rendered his estate subject to inheritance
taxation.8 The ground upon which these cases went was that the control
retained by the settlor made the trust for all practical purposes part of his
estate. Congress aimed its first provisions as to revocable trusts against
evasions of the income tax.

Section 219 (g) of the Act of I924, 9 provided

that the income from a trust would be taxed to the settlor if he reserved
a power of revocation in conjunction with anyone not a beneficiary.10 When
section 302 (d) was under consideration, the committee left out the extremely
pertinent words "not a beneficiary." The committee stated that "this provision is in accord with the principle of section 2I9 (g)"," and from this
it was argued on behalf of the taxpayer that to bring the new section into
accord with 219 (g), "not a beneficiary" should be read in after the term
"any person." But the principle of both sections may just as well be considered to be that taxes should be directed at all property over which the
decedent retained control.' 2 It was apparently considered by the Congressional committee that even a provision for joint revocation indicated the
intention of the donor to exercise some control over the trust, and that evasion could be effected by making the beneficiary one whom the settlor could
influence and thus substantially retain the property. It would seem that the
committee would have worded the new section in the same terms as 219 (g)
had it wanted to create an identical provision. It is undoubtedly true, as
pointed out in the brief of the taxpayer, that courts have frequently read
words into a statute that a literal construction would not imply.' 3 These
cases are all based, however, on the grounds that the obvious spirit of the
statute required such an interpretation, or the court considered that it was
unconstitutional if literally read. It is settled that a statute should be given
8. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625 (1916). This case involved the constitutionality
of the imposition of an inheritance tax by the state of Wisconsin. See also Saltonstall v.
Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 26o (1928), involving the applicability of the Massachusetts tax on

transfers passing by future appointment. The court held the power to revoke was equivalent
to a power of disposition. A tax on the income from trusts revocable by the settlor alone was
upheld in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376 (1930).
9. 43 STAT. 275 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. §96o (1928).

1O. Italics added. This section was subsequently amended to read "in conjunction with
any person not having a sitbstantialadverse interest in the disposition of . . . the corpus

or the income. ... ." 48 STAT. 729 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 166 (1935).
ii. H. R. REP'. No. 179, 68th Cong., Ist Sess.

12. See dissenting opinion of Hand, J., in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. City

Bank Farmers Trust Co., 74 F. (2d) 242, 246 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).

13. See Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142 (I927), where Section 319 of the Revenue
Act of 1924, 43 STAT. 313, which purported to tax all gifts made during the calendar year
1924, was interpreted by four members of the Court to mean all gifts made subsequent to the
enactment of the law; Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S.529 (1922), and Union Trust Co. v. Wardell, 258 U. S.537 (1922), where a similar construction was made as to the words "has at
any time made a transfer," in Section 2o2 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1916, 39 STAT. 777. In
these cases this construction was made to uphold the constitutionality of the Act.
In United States v. Jin luey Moy, 24i U. S.394 (1916), the words "any person" were
construed to apply only to the class of persons described in Section 1 of the Opium Registration Act of 1914, 38 STAT. 785. Again the Court considered the constitutionality of the
Act otherwise interpreted to be the primary consideration.
In United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482 (U. S.1868), a statute making it a crime to obstruct the passage of mail was held inapplicable to an officer of the court who arrested the
carrier for murder under a bench warrant, as a matter of common sense. In Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S.457 (1892), an act to prohibit the importation of
foreigners and aliens under contract to perform labor or service of any kind was held inapplicable to an alien entering the United States under a contract with a religious society to act
as minister, on the ground that the obvious spirit of the statute demanded such a conclusion.
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that interpretation which upholds its constitutionality, and that even a construction that merely throws grave doubts upon its validity should not be
rendered. 1 4 Here, however, the majority of the Court had no doubts of the
constitutionality of the Act; having reached such an opinion, a literal reading
of the statute followed as a matter of course. 15
The view of the majority of the Court that even a joint power of
revocation is a taxable interest, provides the answer to a similar controversy
which arose in the case of Helvering v. Helmholz,1 decided the same day
as the City Bank FarmersTrust Co. case. This involved the first paragraph
of section 302 of the 1926 act, which states that the tax is imposed to the
extent of the interest of the decedent. The argument was made by the taxpayer that no "interest" at all existed, but this was rejected by the Court.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT AS IINTERPRETED

A more doubtful question is presented by consideration of the constitutionality of the statute, when so interpreted. Inheritance taxes are based
upon the privilege of transfer or receipt of some interest of the decedent. 17
That this need not be an actual property right is shown by the decisions
which uphold taxation of trusts in which an absolute power of revocation
is reserved to the settlor alone.' 8 In such cases there is no actual property
right which passes to the beneficiary upon the death of the donor, but "taxation is an intensely practical matter" 19 and it is clear that the trust res does
not pass finally and absolutely beyond the control of the decedent until his
death. At that time the recipient of the property finally avoids all danger of
its being taken from him, and thus gains a very real benefit from the death of
the settlor. Similar reasoning upholds the taxation of estates held by the entireties, or joint estates, ° since death occasions the shifting of practical benefits, not before owned, to the survivor. Gifts in contemplation of death go
somewhat farther afield from the concept of an interest passing at death,
since the gift is irrevocably vested at the time of its completion; but here
the emphasis is on the reason for the transfer and the gift is thought so
closely connected with the death of the donor, by reason of his testamentary
intent, 21 that it may properly be classified with inheritance taxation. 22 Under
14. Panama R. R. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 390 (1924) ; United States v. Delaware &

Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407, 408 (1909).

15. Nevertheless; in addition to the lower court opinions of the three cases discussed in
this note, Lit v. Commissioner, 72 F. (2d) 551 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934) and Commissioner v.
Stevens, 79 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) also decided that a literal reading of the statute
was incorrect. Commissioner v. Strauss, 77 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), is contra.
16. 8o L. ed. 5 (1935).
17. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 47, 56 (19oo).
18. See note 8, supra.
1g. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 212 (1930).
20. Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497 (1930), 79 U. oF PA. L. REV. 233; Gwinn v.
Commissioner, 287 U. S. 224 (1932). For a similar holding as to community property see
Moffitt v. Kelley, 218 U. S. 400 (91o).
21. In Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926), Mr. Justice McReynolds states,
at p. 240, that gifts inter vi-os "are subjected to graduated taxes which could not properly
be laid on all gifts or, indeed, upon any gift without testamentary character." Although this
statement has been proven incorrect as to gift taxes in the case of Bromley v. McCaughn, 28o
U. S. 124 (1929), it clearly implies that the basis for taxing a transfer at death is its testamentary character.
22. See Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 23 (193i).
For a compilation of state
decisions on this point, see series of annotations in (1920) 7 A. L. R. lO28, (1922) 21 A. L.
R. 1335, (1926) 41 A. L. R. 989, (1926) 43 A. L. R. 1229.
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the previous cases, then, some "interest" must pass from the decedent at
his death, or the transfer must have been motivated by impending death,
in order for the transfer to be properly taxed within the classification of
inheritance taxation. Congress has of course the power to tax any transfer; 23 the only constitutional issue is as to the proper exercise of this
admitted power. The real question is the time when the tax may be imposed,
which of course determines the value of the interest to be taxed. This is a
very real and practical distinction when it is considered that if it were possible to tax at death all transfers made by decedent during his life, the tax
would in most cases be unconscionably large due to the graduated system
under which the tax is imposed. Also, the property transferred may in many
cases have greatly increased in value since the time of the transfer. For this
reason, if for no other, it is improper to attempt to impose a death tax upon
a fully completed inter vivos transfer, not in contemplation of death.
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that no additional right passes
to the recipient of the property upon the death of the settlor where the property was previously transferred to him by an inter vivos trust in which the
settlor retained a power to revoke in conjunction with that beneficiary.
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. 24 involved the taxation of seven trusts under
the Revenue Act of 1921, section 402 (c),25 providing, substantially as section 302 (c) of the Act of 1926 26 provides, that gifts in contemplation of
death, or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death, should be
included in the gross estate of the donor. Two of the trusts contained an
absolute power of revocation in the settlor alone, and these the court had no
difficulty in holding taxable. But the other five trusts were revocable only
by the settlor in conjunction with a beneficiary, and here the Court said: 2T
"the trust, for all practical purposes, had passed as completely from any
control by decedent which might inure to his own benefit as if the gift
had been absolute."
The Court goes on to say: 28
"The shifting of the economic interest in the trust property which was
the subject of the tax was thus complete as soon as the trust was made.
His power to recall the property and of control over it for his own
benefit then ceased. .... "
The doctrine of this case has been reaffirmed in Porter v. Commissioner29
and Reinecke v. Smith,30 in differentiating it from other trusts in which
23. See Bromley v. McCaughn, 28o U. S. 124, 137 (1929).
24. 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
25. 42 STAT. 278 (I92i).

26. 44 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §411 (c) (1935).
27. 278 U. S. 339, 346 (1929).
23.

Ibid.

29. 288 U. S. 436 (1933). The settlor of a trust reserved the right to alter or modify in
any way, excepting any change in favor of himself or his estate. The Court held section
302 (d) applicable, distinguishing Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. by the fact that the trusts
were beyond decedent's control in the latter case, where revocable only with a beneficiary.
30. 289 U. S. 172 (1933).
The case involved the taxability of income from a trust
revocable by the settlor and either of two trustees under section 219 (g) of the Act of 1924.
The Court discussed Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. and approved the doctrine that the trusts
could not be taxed as property of the settlor because of the absence of control in him.
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the settlor retained more control. Although the statute involved in Reinecke
v. Northern Trust Co. is essentially different from that involved in the instant
case, the case is a direct holding to the effect that a trust revocable by the
settlor only in conjunction with a beneficiary is no longer within the control
of the settlor, and that nothing can pass by reason of his death. Mr. Justice
Roberts is far from denying this :31 "The case involved nothing more than
a determination whether the transfers were complete when made."
He then goes on to state that here we have a different problem, since section 302 (d) "on its face embraces Mrs. James's transfer, although complete
when made and thereafter beyond her unfettered control." The problem is
of course different, since the question there was whether the trusts could be
included in the estate of the settlor under the terms of section 402 (c), while
here the question is whether, with that holding in mind, it can be said that
the statute specifically including this trust is so arbitrary and capricious as
to be violative of the Fifth Amendment.
Statutes creating a presumption that gifts made within an arbitrary
period before death have been made in contemplation of death have been held
so arbitrary and capricious as to deny due process of law to the taxpayer.3 2
From the language of the instant case it would appear to be logical to assume
that a similarly arbitrary assumption is made here. The reason for the imposition of this tax is apparently that it is assumed that the beneficiary is one
over whom the donor has such influence that the transfer is a mere attempt
to evade the statute, and is not intended to be a bona fide transfer. Mr.
Justice Roberts so indicates: 38
"The purpose of Congress in adding clause (d) to the section as it
stood in an earlier act was to prevent avoidance of the tax by the device
of joining with the grantor in the exercise of the power of revocation
someone whom he believed would comply with his wishes. Congress
may well have thought that a beneficiary who was of the grantor's
immediate family U might be amenable to persuasion or be induced to
consent to a revocation in consideration of other expected benefits from
the grantor's estate. Congress may adopt a measure reasonably calculated to prevent avoidance of a tax."
Without this assumption it is difficult to see any ground for taxation according to the dogma that an inheritance tax is based upon the transfer of some
interest or economic benefit at death. This does not appear to be a less
arbitrary assumption than the one that a transfer made within a set period
was made in contemplation of death. Mr. Justice Roberts answered the claim
that this is an attempt to tax a previously completed transfer by stating that
Congress has the right to use any means that are reasonably connected with
the exercise of the admitted power to tax interests passing at death, and
31.

So

L. ed. I, 3 (1935).

32. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932) ; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230

(i926).
33. So L. ed. 1, 4 (1935).
34. This language raises the question of whether the Court would hold the statute constitutional if the beneficiary with whom the settlor had the power to revoke were not a member of the grantor's family. It might be considered that this did not threaten illegal avoidance of the tax, and hence the statute would not be a reasonable means of preventing avoidance in such a case.
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that this prohibits evasion. This same argument was advanced in the case
of Schlesinger v. Wisconsin,35 involving a Wisconsin tax which created a
presumption that gifts made within six years of death had been made in
contemplation of death. The Court there stated: "Rights guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution are not to be so lightly treated; they are superior
to this supposed necessity." 31 Where there is in fact control, an inheritance
tax is properly laid; where there is none, and the beneficiary gains no added
benefit from the settlor's death, all established theories of the basis for an
inheritance tax prohibit its imposition. The instant Court has admitted
that there is no control in this case; and it is difficult to see any benefit to
the beneficiary in the death of the settlor, since all he need do to retain
the benefit of the trust is to refuse to revoke on demand of the settlor. An
assumption that the beneficiary is subservient to the desires of the settlor
seems wholly arbitrary.
It has been suggested that the implications to be drawn from the case
of Burnet v. Wells, 37 carried to their logical extremity, will mean the end
of the family trust as a means of avoiding the inheritance or income tax.38
That case held that the income from unalterable and irrevocable trusts established for the payment of premiums on insurance policies on the life of the
settlor, payable to various relatives of the settlor, may be taxed as part of
his income. 39 An indication that this policy would not be extended is to
be found in the case of Hoeperv. Commissioner,40 where a statute attempting
to evaluate a taxpayer's income tax upon his own and his wife's combined
incomes was held unconstitutional. But the implications to be drawn from
Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. go vastly farther than those
of the Burnet case. Since the acquiescence of the beneficiary amounts to
a return of the property to the settlor in the case where the power of revocation is held jointly by the settlor and the beneficiary, it could logically be
held that any trust for a member of the settlor's family could be taxed as
part of the estate of the settlor since it might have been given on the condition that he return it on request. At least three members of the Court
would very probably assert that this was a valid means of preventing avoidance of the inheritance tax.4" Some light is thrown on their attitude by
the case of Helvering v. Helmholz,4 2 decided the same day.
In that case the settlor established a trust in 1918 which was to terminate upon the written agreement of all the beneficiaries, of whom the settlor
was one. The trust funds had been provided by the settlor and the other
beneficiaries, and upon a. termination agreement the corpus was to return
to its various sources. The government attempted to place an estate tax
on the settlor's share of the trust under section 302 (d). It was held that
the section did not apply, but three justices concurred in the result solely on
the ground that since the trust was created prior to the enactment Df the
35. 270 U. S. 230 (1926).
36. Id. at 240.
37. 289 U. S. 670 (1933).

Four justices dissented.

38. See Sutter and Owen, supra note 3, at 1185.
39. The Court reasoned that the payment of the policies was a normal expense of the
taxpayer, and therefore he was the one to get the benefit from the income of the trusts.
40. 284

U.

S. 2o6 (1931).

41. Mr. Justice Cardozo, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Stone.
42. 8o L. ed. 5 (1935).
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statute, taxing the settlor would be giving the statute an illegal retroactive
effect. 43 The theory of the majority of the Court was that there was no
power to revoke reserved to the settlor, since all the beneficiaries of a trust
can always terminate; the provision in the trust agreement was regarded as
merely expressive of the already existing law. Although there is a factual
difference between revocation in conjunction with one beneficiary and revocation by all the beneficiaries, 44 no such distinction is drawn in section 302 (d),
nor is any indicated by the opinion in the City Bank FarmersTrust Co. case.
Had it not been for the retroactive effect of the statute in the Helmholz
case, three concurring justices would have held the settlor liable to taxation.
The underlying factor seems to be the power of the settlor to influence the
beneficiary or beneficiaries to agree to return the property to him. If it be
constitutional to tax the interests in these cases as passing at the settlor's
death, it would seem equally proper to apply an estate tax to the "interest"
of a person establishing an outright trust, with no provision at all for
revocation, for a member of his family; the beneficiary might be induced to
renounce his claim. Stress was also made of the fact that the provision was
for "termination" and not for revocation, but the fact remains that the
settlor's share of the corpus was to revert to the settlor in case of such
termination, so that the effect was the same as though "revocation" had
been the term used.
Another case decided the same day as those discussed above was White
v. Poor,4 5 which involved the applicability of section 302 (d) to a trust
where the power to terminate was given to all of the acting trustees of a
trust created in 1919. The settlor was a trustee at the time of her death,
although she had resigned at one time for a period of a year, and had then
been reappointed. It was held that the section did not apply since the settlor
did not retain her joint power to revoke by reason of any power reserved in
the trust instrument, but by reason of her appointment. Again three members of the Court concurred in the result apparently for the sole reason that
the statute would be retroactively applied as to this trust. The case is technically distinguishable on two grounds from Helvering v. City Bank Farmers

Trust Co. The power was to "terminate" rather than "revoke" and section
302 (d) applies only to the power to "alter, amend or revoke". But on termination it was provided that the corpus should revert to the settlor, so that
the distinction is one of shadow. Also, the settlor did not expressly reserve
the power to herself, but merely to the trustees, of which she happened to
be one. Very clearly the purpose of the act is far from being carried out
by this holding. There is infinitely more control than in the case of Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., since the trustees have no interest
43. Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone, and Mr. Justice Cardozo were the concurring justices. It would appear to be tacit from the form of their concurrence that they disapproved the general reasoning in the majority opinion.
44. It would appear that all of the interested parties to a trust can revoke it in many
jurisdictions [see 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 993], while one beneficiary cannot, of course, effect a revocation in derogation of the rights of the others. Hence, in such
jurisdictions, the difference would appear to be more than factual; where the power to revoke or alter is reserved to the settlor in conjunction with all the beneficiaries, no added right
is reserved; but where reserved in conjunction with only one or a majority, the reasoning of
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. is valid.
45. 8o L. ed. 8 (935).
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adverse to the settlor. It has been established that a power reserved to the
settlor to revoke in conjunction with a trustee is such a reserved power as
will justify a trust being taxed as passing in possession and enjoyment by
virtue of death. 4 6 Stress was made of the fact that the settlor was trustee
by virtue of the appointment rather than by reservation in the instrument.
As a method of avoiding the strict application of section 302 (d) the subterfuge would not be difficult to arrange. This distinction, it may be admitted,
is justifiable under the terms of the statute, but a continuation of the present
attack by Congress upon tax avoidance will undoubtedly fill this gap in the
future. For the present it is necessary only for the trust instrument to
provide for termination rather than revocation, the corpus reverting to the
settlor upon such termination, and to place the power of termination in the
trustees. In this way section 302 (d) may be avoided and at the same
time control may be substantially retained by the settlor.
Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. 47 arose under, section 302 (c)
of the Revenue Act of 1924,48 which provides:
"The value of the gross estate of decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated . . . (c) To the extent
of any interest . . . with respect to which [the decedent] has at any

time created a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death . . ."
Decedent established a trust to pay the income to his daughter during her
life, then to the children of the daughter. It contained a provision that if the
daughter should predecease the settlor the corpus should revert to him.
The daughter survived the settlor, and the commissioner determined that
the trust should be included within his estate. The Board of Tax Appeals
held the section inapplicable, 49 and this was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals 50 and the Supreme Court, on the ground that the transfer was
complete when made and nothing passed by virtue of death. The Chief
Justice rendered a dissenting opinion in which three other members of the
Court joined. This dissent was based on the argument that the possibility
of reverter retained by the settlor was a valuable interest which in effect
prevented the final passing of the property until his death, and that the
common law distinction between vested and contingent interests was immaterial for tax purposes. It is obvious that if the settlor had provided that
the property should go to his daughter only on condition that she should
survive him, that the property would have passed by virtue of his death, and
the statute would have been applied."- The distinction between the two
46. Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 26o (1928).

See Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S.

172 (1933), to the effect that a trustee does not owe a duty to the cestui que trust to refrain

from revoking the instrument and that he is not a "beneficiary" within the meaning of section 219 (g) of the Act of 1924.
47. So L. ed. 49 (1935); see also Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 8o L. ed. 54
(935).
48. 43 STAT. 304 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. §4ii (935).
49. 28 B. T. A. 1o7 (933).
50. 75 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
5i. Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231'(i3i), holding the similar provisions of section 402 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1918 applicable.
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estates is no longer of practical value, and if the question were one of first
impression it would not be an extraordinary result to find the Court, in the
frame of mind indicated by the City Bank case, holding the statute applicable.
This is particularly true in view of language previously used by the Court
in referring to the power of succession of the recipient of property: 52
" . . .in determining whether it has been so exercised, technical distinctions between vested remainders and other interests are of little avail."
The precise point was previously presented to the Court in the case of Helvering v. Duke,53 where the Board of Tax Appeals had held that a trust containing a possibility of reverter in the settlor should not be taxed to the settlor, 54
and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 55 In the Supreme Court the
judgment was affirmed by an equally divided Court, Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes not sitting. The majority in the St. Louis Union Trust Co. case
distinguished the similar case of Klein v. United States 56 on the ground that
there the remainder was vested in the settlor subject to divestment, so that
the interest of the beneficiary did not become vested until the death of the
57
settlor. Mr. Justice Stone thought the cases indistinguishable on principle.
As far as completeness of transfer is concerned, the beneficiary does not gain
an indefeasible title until the death of the settlor, since his death prior to the
death of the latter will revest title in the settlor. Hence the beneficiary
undoubtedly gains economic benefits from the death of the settlor. As
against this is the doctrine of the common law that a possibility of reverter
does not affect the completeness of a transfer; title passed beyond the control
of the settlor by his first transfer to the trustee. The question is a close one,
but one would not expect a court that had decided Helvering v. City Bank
FarmersTrust Co. to have difficulty in holding it taxable. Looking "to substance, not to form", 58 as Mr. Justice Stone did in his dissenting opinion,
something does pass by reason of the death of the settlor. 59 But applying
the same philosophy to Helvering v. City Bank FarmersTrust Co., one finds
that the power of revocation is in fact no power at all, but merely a provision for the return of the property by the beneficiary, unless a completely
arbitrary presumption (that the beneficiary is one who will be subservient
to the will of the settlor) is adopted. A contrary result in Helvering v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co. would not go so far as the City Bank case. It is
surprising to find Mr. Justice Roberts, writer of the opinion in the latter
case, leading the way to the somewhat inconsistent holding in the former.
The way would now appear to be open for Congress to stop all present
gaps in the inheritance tax laws. A statute including trusts revocable by the
52. Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 271 (1928).
53. 290 U. S. 591 (933).
54. 23 B. T. A. iio4 (i93I).
55. 62 F. (2d) i057 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
56. 283 U. S. 231 (I931).
57. See Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 8o L. ed. 49, 53 (935).
58. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone.
59. It was argued in the brief of the taxpayer that the only interest passing from the decedent was a possibility of reverter, which was incapable of evaluation. In view of the first
paragraph of section 301, which taxes the interest of the decedent, there would appear to be
some merit in the contention, were it not for the City Bank Farmers Trust Co. case; but there
the "interest" retained was held to include the entire value of the property, and it is probable
that, had the Court determined that something passed here by reason of death, the tax would
have been imposed on the basis of the entire value of the property.
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trustees would certainly be upheld as a reasonable exercise of Congress'
undoubted power to tax estates and to prevent avoidance of such taxes. The
Court may reconsider its stand on the St. Louis Union Trust Co. case if
Congress attempts expressly to tax possibilities of reverter. While White v.
Poor,Helvering v. Helmholz and Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.
leave present openings in the existing inheritance tax laws, the probability
that they will long provide a means of tax avoidance is slight indeed.
T. R. W., Jr.

McCandless v. Furlaud: the End of the Doctrine of Old Dominion

Copper Co. v. Lewisohn?
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Old
Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn 1 in 19o8 has provoked a great deal of
periodical literature on the subject of corporate promoters' profits. 2 The
principal point of controversy concerning that case was the Court's denial
of promoters' liability with respect to prospective shareholders. It now
appears that this type of substantial limitation on the liability of promoters
has come to an end with the decision by the Supreme Court in McCandless
v. Furlaud.3

Dissenting Justice Roberts observes that " . . . the decision

now made in effect overrules the Old Dominion case", 4 and a close examination of the facts and opinions is accordingly in order. This is particularly
advisable since the Furlaudcase presents an amazing example of the intricate
corporate maneuverings which can be devised to mulct the investing public.
FACTS

About thirty-five years after promoters Bigelow and Lewisohn initiated
the corporate existence of the Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting
Company, 5 Maxime H. Furlaud, an equally ingenious entrepreneur, organized the Duquesne Gas Corporation.
Furlaud was president and principal shareholder of an investment
banking house, Furlaud & Company, Inc. Kingston corporation was a subsidiary of the Furlaud corporation, being solely controlled by the Furlaud
interests. For $45,5IO Furlaud corporation procured options to purchase
Pennsylvania gas fields, the options running in the name of Kingston corporation."
1.

210

The purchase price of these lands was $2,572,989.

Their fair

U. S. 206. A collection of cases on "Promoters' Transactions" centering around

The Old Dominion Company cases appears in F=,

AssociATio s

(1935)

CASES

AND

STATUTES

ON BUSINESS

X14-150.

For a few good discussions, see Weston, Promoters' Liability: Old Dominion v. Bigelow (1916) 30 HARv.L. REV. 39; Brockelbank, The Compeisation of Promoters (1934) 13
OR. L. REV. 195; Note (1933) 81 U. oF PA.L. REv. 746; Note (1934) 22 CALiF. L. REV.
326. And see generally EHiascH, THE LAw OF PRomoTERs (1916).
3. 56 Sup. Ct. 4I (1935).
4. Id. at 53.
5. The Dominion Co. was organized on July 8, 1895. See Old Dominion Copper Co. v.
Lewisohn, 210 U. S. 206, 21o (19o8). The Duquesne Gas Corporation was formed in February, 1930. See McCandless v. Furlaud, 56 Sup. Ct. 41, 43 (935).
6. According to the report of the case in the Circuit Court of Appeals "some of these
options were taken in the name of an individual and later assigned to the Kingston Corporation." See McCandless v. Furlaud, 75 F. (2d) 977, 978 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
2.
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value was about $2,700,000. Purposely inflated engineers' appraisal of the
lands gave their value as $7,000,000.
In furtherance of the promotion
scheme the Duquesne Gas Corporation was formed as a Pennsylvania corporation, having an authorized capital stock of iooo no-par common shares.
With an outlay of $5o0, Furlaud corporation bought the whole issue at
5o per share.7 Furlaud men became the sole shareholders and directors
of the new enterprise. The increase of the capital stock was to come afterwards. By newspaper advertisement public subscriptions were invited to a
$4,ooo,ooo 6 percent mortgage bond issue and a $I,OOO,OOO 6y2 percent mortgage note issue of the new Duquesne Gas Corporation; the marketing of the
securities was to be done through the medium of a banking syndicate formed
for that purpose. About a month after the Duquesne corporation came into
existence its authorized capital stock was increased by the directors to
1,250,000 shares. 8 One hundred and thirty-nine thousand of these shares
were bought by Furlaud corporation at 50¢ per share.
Artificial appraisal of the gas land value; formation of Duquesne corporation as fountain head of the scheme; solicitation of public investments;
increase of Duquesne's authorized capital stock-all these had been completed. Only a few more steps were necessary before the tapping of the
public wallet could actually begin.
An agreement was then made by Duquesne corporation with its Kingston brother to buy the gas lands as soon as the latter obtained title. 9 Kingston corporation was to pay the individual owners of these lands $2,572,989
for title. And under the Duquesne-Kingston agreement, Duquesne corporation was to pay Kingston for the same lands $3,015,000 in cash,10 bonds
of $1,300,000 par value which were to be issued as an encumbrance on the
lands when Duquesne took title, and 535,ooo no-par shares of its now increased capital stock. To get the cash to pay Kingston for title to the lands,
Duquesne corporation agreed to sell all of its forthcoming mortgage notes
($i,ooo,ooo worth) and $2,700,000 of its forthcoming mortgage bonds-to
Furlaud corporation.
But how was Kingston corporation to get the necessary $2,572,989 to
pay the owners for the gas tracts and set the enterprise in motion? And
how was Furlaud corporation to get $3,379,500 in cash (the amount to be
paid to Duquesne for its notes and bonds), so that Duquesne would have
the necessary cash to pay Kingston for transfer of the title to the lands?
The money of the investing public would not be available in payment of the
subscriptions to the forthcoming bond and note issue "till the bonds with
the deed of trust were ready for delivery, and delivery was impossible until
Duquesne, the mortgagor, had title to the fields." ii But promoters' ingenuity
worked "out a plan that would synchronize the two transactions, the cashing
7. The price of 5o a share was "authorized by the board of directors of the Duquesne
Gas Corporation." Ibid.
8. At the same time that the increase in capital stock was authorized, the issuance of the
bond and note issue was authorized. Ibid.
9. It was "an agreement of reorganization" whereby the Kingston corporation "agreed
it would cause the optioned properties, all its assets other than cash, to be transferred to the
Duquesne Gas Corporation. . . ." Ibid.
IO.This cash was in reality an assumption of an obligation of the Kingston corporation
to a bank in that amount. Ibid.
ii.McCandless v. Furlaud, 56 Sup. Ct. 41, 44 (935).
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of the subscriptions and the payments for the lands."

12

A one-day bank

credit was arranged to take care of the Kingston ($2,572,989) cash need
and the Furlaud ($3,379,500) cash need.

And as Justice Cardozo graphically narrates :13 "The appointed day
arrived. Kingston drew against the credit . . . set up in its favor, . . ."
Title passed to Kingston; then to Duquesne. The Duquesne bond and note
issue was released. 14 The public cash in payment for the subscriptions to
the bond and note issue was delivered ' 5 -more than enough to take care
of the bank loans represented by the one-day credit. And "Duquesne had
the ownership of gas fields, worth at cost about $2,500,000, though extravagantly appraised at many millions more. It had also $365,000 working
capital. True, it had received $3,379,500 [from Furlaud corporation for the
bonds and notes], but it had paid out at once $3,015,000 [to Kingston for
title to the lands as per the Duquesne-Kingston agreement].

.

.

. These are

the credit items that any balance sheet must show. The liabilities were the
bonds and notes and the no-par shares of stock. The bonds and notes, when
distributed to the public, became liens for $5,ooo,ooo, more than $2,ooo,ooo
in excess of the cost of all the assets with working capital included. The
shares of stock, issued in vast quantities, had nothing of substance back of
them. .

. The bonds and notes, instead of being used by Furlaud and its

.

allies for the benefit of Duquesne, were disposed of as their own and at a
large profit to themselves. . . . [In fact, about three-fifths of the money
was applied to the designated uses, the rest being kept for the use of the
promoters.] Less than two years later the victimized company was in the
hands of a receiver." 16
12.

Ibid.

13. Ibid.
14. As soon as the Furlaud corporation delivered its check to Duquesne drawn on the

one-day bank credit in payment for its share of Duquesne's bonds and notes, the securities
were immediately delivered to the Furlaud corporation. McCandless v. Furlaud, 75 F. (2d)
977, 979 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
15. The banking syndicate had organized both a "distributing group" of security dealers

and a "secondary distributing group" to effectuate rapid disposition of the bonds and notes.
Ibid. The issue is described in the opinion as a "spectacular success." 56 Sup. Ct. 41, 43.
i6. McCandless v. Furlaud, 56 Sup. Ct. 41, 44 (1935). An attempt has been made to
prepare, from a collection of the figures appearing in the Court's opinions, balance sheets
showing the financial picture of Duquesne Gas Corporation at various stages of the promoters' manipulations:
BALANCE SHEET #I-Statement of Financial Condition of Duquesne Gas Corporation
on its formation with the originally authorized capital stock of IOOO no-par
shares.
Assnrs
Current Assets

Cash (received from Furlaud)

$5oo.oo

LIABm TSIEs
AND CITrrAL
Capital Stock
iooo shares, no-par value (issued to Furlaud)

$5oo.oo

BALANCE SHEEr #2-Statement of Financial Condition of Duquesne Gas Corporation
after Amendment of originally authorized capital stock to 1,25oooo no-par
shares.

AssETs
Current Assets
Cash (received from Furlaud)
Subscription receivable (from Furlaud)
Total Current Assets

$

500.00
69,5oo.oo

$70,000o-0o
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McCandless as receiver of Duquesne corporation sued the corporate
promoters, Kingston corporation (Furlaud & Co., Inc., had been dissolved),
LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL

Capital stock
Authorized capital stock
Less: Capital stock unissued
Subscribed and Issued
Consisting of
Furlaud Subscriptions of

1,250,000 shares

io,ooo shares
I4o,ooo shares

$7oooo.oo

i,ooo shares
139,000 shares

i4O,OOO shares
of Financial Condition of Duquesne Gas Corporation
showing the fraudulent appraisal value of the lands. Bonds and notes not yet
distributed to the public. Corporation still in a state of "technical solvency."
Cf. Note (1926) 26 CoL L. REv. 447, 452.

BALANCE SHIxT #3-Statement

AssETs
Current Assets
Cash
$2,430,000.00
From Furlaud for bonds
"
"
"
notes
88oooo.oo
originally authorized
500.00
capital stock
subscription to increased
69,500.00
authorized capital stock
$3,380,000.00

Total Current Assets
Fixed Assets
Gas lands (fraudulent appraisal value)

7,000,000.00
$10,380,000.00

Total Assets
LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL

Current Liabilities
Due Kingston Corp. for lands
Fixed Liabilities
Notes payable (6I2,%) due Furlaud
Bonds payable (6%)
due Furlaud
due Kingston
Total Fixed Liabilities
Capital Stock
Authorized capital stock
Less: Capital stock unissued
Issued and Outstanding capital stock
consisting of:
14oooo shares
to Furlaud
535,000 shares
to Kingston

$3,015,000.00
$i,000,000.00

2,700,000.00
1,300,000.00
$5,000,000.00
1,250,000 shares

575,000 shares
675,000 shares

2,365,000.00*

675,000 shares
Total Liabilities
Note: Working capital ($365,00o)
bilities ($3,015,000).

equals current assets ($3,380,000)

$IO,38o,ooo.00
minus current lia-

*This figure was obtained by subtracting total current and fixed liabilities from total
assets.
BALANCE SnEET #4-Statement of Financial Condition of Duquesne Gas Corporation
showing actual value of land and corporate financial condition after bonds and
notes were issued to public and "after all the circuits had been traveled." Corporation actually insolvent.
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and others for an accounting of the allegedly unlawful profits. The Federal
District Court 17 gave a decree against the defendants, awarding damages
to the receiver of $1,554,779.73 with interest, "which was the difference

between the moneys realized by the promoters through the sale of bonds and
notes . . . , and the amount paid to Duquesne and devoted to its proper
uses

.

18

.

The defendants were held not liable for any gains arising

from the disposition of the no-par shares. The substance of the lower court
decision granting a recovery was based on the fraudulent appraisal of the
value of the gas lands, making "the proceeds of the subscriptions . . .
chargeable with a trust for the benefit of Duquesne and the holders of its
mortgage debt. 19 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 20
reversed the District Court, posing their decision of no liability squarely
on the doctrine of Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn. On writ of cerAssErs
Current Assets
Cash
From Furlaud for Bonds
$2,430,0o.00
cc
" Notes
88oooo.oo
..
.
" Originally Authorized
Capital Stock
500.00
Subscription to increase
Authorized Capital Stock 69,500.00
Total Original Cash
Less: Disbursed to Kingston in payment for lands

$3,380,000.00
3,015,000.00

$ 365,ooo.0o

Total Current Assets
Fixed Assets
Gas lands (at the lower of cost or market value)

2,572,989.00

Total Assets

$2,937,989.00

LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL

Fixed Liabilities
Notes Payable (63%)-Due Furlaud
Bonds Payable (6%o)D.ue Furlaud
$2,700,000.00
Due Kingston
1,300,000.00

$1,000,000.00
4,000,000.00

$4,000,000.00
Total Fixed Liabilities
Capital Stock
Authorized Capital Stock
1,250,000 shares
Less: Unissued Capital Stock 575,000 shares
Issued and Outstanding

675,000 shares

Total Liabilities and Deficit
*This is a minus figure showing the "surplus-deficit."
excess of the total assets, the value of the capital stock is to
represents the approximate amount of watered value in the
lands. See Balance Sheet #3.
17. The case in the District Court is commented upon in
I8. McCandless v. Furland, 56 Sup. Ct. 41, 45 (1935).
i9. Ibid.

$5,000,000.00

no-par value

2,062,011.00*

$2,937,989.00

Since the fixed liabilities are in
that extent a negative one. This
promoter's appraisal of the gas
(1933) 33 Co. L. REV. Io65.

75 F. (2d) 977 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). The instant case had had a previous hearing in
the Circuit Court of Appeals, the bill being dismissed "on the ground that the appointment of
the ancillary receiver was void for want of jurisdiction. 68 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ."
56 Sup. Ct. 41, 45 (1935). The United States Supreme Court in 293 U. S. 67 (1934) reversed
the Circuit Court ordering a determination of,the merits.
20.
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tiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court of
Appeals by a five-to-four vote, affirming the District Court's holding with
the modification that the defendants should be liable even for the gains
resulting from the disposition of the no-par shares, representing an additional recovery of some $1,275,000.

Mr. Justice Roberts filed a vigorous

dissenting opinion, with Justices McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler
concurring.
MAJORITY OPINION: CARDOZO, J.

Characteristic writing and thinking mark the majority opinion: "Promoters of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relation to it to this extent at
least, that they will be chargeable as trustees if they deal with it unconscionably

.

.

.

or in violation of a statute, unless the liability for such mis-

conduct has been effectually released." 21
Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn is distinguished from the Furlaud case in definite terms. These distinctions will be discussed later.
In placing full responsibility on the promoters a number of considerations are particularly emphasized by the Court:
(I) The effect of the promoters' conduct is said to saddle Duquesne
corporation with practical insolvency, or at least actionably to
reduce the creditors' protective buffer "at the outset of its business
life." 22 Hence the interests affected here are the creditors' rights
not to have the corporate assets wrongfully impaired to their detriment. The instant suit is to redress such a wrong.
to
(2)
Only three-fifths of the public moneys solicited was applied
28
corporate uses; the promoters pocketed the other two-fifths.
(3) The conduct of the promoters was violative of a Pennsylvania
constitutional provision forbidding fictitious bond or stock issues 24
(Duquesne corporation being of Pennsylvania origin) since cases

hold that the constitutional prohibition "is not escaped through the
receipt 25
of some property or money if the amount or value is inade-

quate".

(4) Imminently prospective creditors-namely, the bondholders and
noteholders who were represented by the plaintiff receiver-are to
be treated as existing creditors for the purpose of being protected
against the corporate approval of the promoters' wrongful conduct
21. 56 Sup. Ct. 41, 45 (935).
22. See balance sheets 3 and 4 in note 16, supra.
23. In the Lewisohn case innocent public subscribers were lured into a corporate promotional enterprise to the extent of only a 2/,5 proportion of the total investment involved; the
Court refused to hold the promoter liable. In this case, where the inveigled public sup-

plied the total corporate investment, and the promoters personally pocketed 6/15 of the investment, the promoters were called to account.
24. "No corporation shall issue either stocks or bonds except for money, labor done, or
money or property actually received; and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall
be void." PA. CONST. (Purdon, 1930) art. XVI, § 7.
1930) tit. I5,§ 131.

See also PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon,

25. 56 Sup. Ct. 41, 48 (1935), citing the following decisions: Commonwealth v. Reading
Traction Co., 204 Pa. 151, 53 AtI. 755 (19o2) ; Big Spring Electric Co. v. Kitzmiller, 268 Pa.
34, 38, iio Atl. 783, 784 (ig2o) ; In re Wyoming Valley Ice Co., 153 Fed. 787 (M. D. Pa.
1907), aff'd sub nor. Wiegand v. Albert Lewis Lumber Mfg. Co., 158 Fed. 6o8, 6o9, 6io (C.
C. A. 3d, i9o8).
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manifested by the shareholders and directors.2 6 Such consent "can
never be operative to the prejudice of others where consent is in
derogation of the public policy of the state or the prohibition of a
statute."
(5)

The transaction was considered as a unit,

" . .

.

infected with a

common vice. Everything of profit arising out of the abused
relation must now be yielded up." 27 This includes profits and
proceeds from the no-par shares as well as from the bonds and
notes.
DISSENTING

OPINION: ROBERTS,

J.

Justice Roberts' dissent is based almost entirely on the limiting principles set up in the Lewisohn case. The bonds, notes, and shares were transferred by Duquesne to the promoters, and it was later that the promoters
passed them on to the unsuspecting public. The promoters themselves being
the only existing creditors and shareholders at the time of their fraud, the
corporation had no cause of action against the promoters due to the "assent"
of all the then existing shareholders and creditors. It was accordingly urged
that the public subscribers should be remediless save for their individual
deceit actions against the defendant promoters. Although the Lewisohn
case had involved no potential creditors, this is thought by the dissenters
not to be a valid basis for differentiation.
A minor complaint against the majority result of recovery added that
granting damages to the receiver would inure to the benefit of the general
creditors of the corporation, as well as to the bond and noteholders, the
general28creditors being people to whom the promoters were under no obligation.

Though Mr. Justice Roberts' fealty to the Lewisohn doctrines is unswerving, it cannot but be noticed that he too recognized its serious shortcomings: "I concur in the view that the promoters of Duquesne Gas Corporation took an unconscionable profit which they reaped at the expense of a
credulous and avid purchasing public. This fact, however much it may invite
animadversion, ought not to induce the courts to disregard settled principles in an effort to deprive the [defendants] of the fruits of their
scheme." 29
THE

Lewisohn

CASE COMPARED

As early as 1913 it was intimated that the Supreme Court had regretted
its stand in the Lewisohn case by its step away from the doctrine in the case
of Davis v. Las Ovas Co., Inc.30 That the intimation has become an outspoken regret is relatively clear from the opinions of both the majority and
dissenting justices in the Furlaud case. But before hailing the decision as
26. Cf. Note (1934) 22 CALIF. L. REV. 326.
27. 56 Sup. Ct. 41, 49 (1935).
28. For contrasting points of view about the damages aspect of recoveries in promoters'
transactions compare Weston, Promoters' Liability: Old Dominion v. Bigelow (19x6) 3o
HAv. L. REv. 3. And cf. note (1934) 47 HiARv. L. REv. 1031 with note (1931) 26 ILL. L.
REV. 340, 341. See also Brockelbank, The Compensation of Prointoters (1934) 13 ORE. L.
REV. 195, and especially 204-212.
29. Instant case at 50, 51.
30. 227 U. S. 8o (1913) discussed in Note (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 447, 451, and in Brock-

elbank, supra note 2, at 212. In this case there was not a full disclosure by one group of
promoters to another group of promoters at the time of the sale, and the Court held the first
promoters liable.
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a complete reversal, certain factors should be noted by virtue of which it
is possible to distinguish the two cases.
In determining promoters' responsibility, there are a number of operative facts which courts generally regard. One may be described as the
intention of the promoter in acquiring the property which he transferred
to the corporation. 1 In the Lewisohn case the property was acquired outright by the promoters-there was nothing in the way of a "shoe-string"
transaction which would indicate a lack of good faith. Not as much can be
said for the defendants in the Furlaud case. They took only options on the
gas lands, and when first acquired these options were gratuitous. It is true
that $45,510 was later paid "to give them binding force", but in proportion
to the magnitude of the Duquesne project, the promoters' risk assumed at
the outset was almost inconsequential. Liability can more readily be found
on that account; 32 the promoters' motives in acquiring the property are
more open to suspicion than in the Lewisohn case.88
A related consideration, also bearing on the amount of risk which the
promoters undertook and the consequent light thrown on their motives,
has to do with the promoters' subscription to the the authorized capital
stock. In the Lewisohn case the mining syndicate formed by the promoters
retained thirteen-fifteenths of the total stock, only two-fifteenths being subscribed by the general public. To Justice Holmes this was evidence at least
84
that they "believed in the enterprise" and had no deliberate plan to defraud.
The Furlaud interests took but 140,000 out of 1,25oooo authorized no-par

shares, approximately one-ninth of the total capital stock. At the rate of
5ob a share, they paid for the stock only $70,000. In the further financial jugglery that followed, they received an additional 535,000 shares as a
"bonus". For an outlay of $70,000 they had acquired, at the 5o rate,
$337,500 worth of stock. The rapidity with which they disposed of the
complete block through stock operators for $850,000 manifested clearly that
to them a $780,000 profit in pocket from this portion of their scheme was
vastly preferable to exhibiting any further "belief in the enterprise". In
this respect, too, the Lewisohn promoters invited judicial wrath less openly
than did those in the Furlaud case.
31. Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Calif. 226, 193 Pac. 243 (192o); Densmore Oil Co. v.
Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 (187o). Length of time the promoters have held the property and uses
to which promoters have put property are other facts disclosing the promoters' intention in
acquiring the property which they transferred to the corporation. Cf. Russell v. Rock Run
Fuel Gas Co., 184 Pa. 102, 39 AUt. 21 (1898) and Milwaukee Cold Storage Co. v. Dexter, 99
Wis. 214, 74 N. W. 976 (1898).
32. Cf. Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Calif. 236, 193 Pac. 243 (1920) ; Clark v. Daniels,
250 Mich. 22, 229 N. W. 495 (1930).
33. "Options" entered into the Lewisohn case only to a limited, uninfluential extent:
"Bigelow and Lewisohn, in May and June, 1895, obtained options . . . for the purchase
of the stock and the property. . . . They also formed a syndicate to carry out their plan,
with the agreement that the money subscribed by the members should be used for the purchase and the sale to a new corporation, at a large advance, and that the members, in the
proportion of their subscriptions, should receive in cash or in stock of the new corporation,
the profit made by the sale. On May 28, 1895, Bigelow paid

. .

.

for

.

.

.

stock on

behalf of the Syndicate, in cash and notes of himself and Lewisohn, and in June Keyser (another vendor) was paid in the same way." A month or so after full payment for the purchased property had taken place, Old Dominion Co. came into existence. Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 21o U. S. 2o6, 210 (198o).
34. Id. at 215. Cf. McCandless v. Furlaud, 56 Sup. Ct. 41, 46 (935).
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The way in which the suit arises may influence the result. In the
Lewisohn case the suit was brought by the corporation against the promoter;
no creditors were involved. The Furlaud case arose as an action by a receiver, representing the holders of bonds and notes-creditors. The significance of the entrance of creditors into the picture will be further discussed
presently. Meanwhile it should be observed that one more differentiating
factor exists. There is the Pennsylvania constitutional provision, forbidding
fictitious issuance of stock or bonds, 3 5 in the Furlaudcase; it had no counterpart in the Lewisohsn litigation. Governing public policy, as exemplified by
such provisions in statutes or constitutions, may often be a factor of great
weight. 36 There are other factors which enter into a consideration of cases
of this sort,3 7 but only those which are directly involved in comparing the
Lewisohn and Furlaud decisions have been indicated here. Probably the
most important for this purpose concerns the nature of the interests affected,
particularly whether the interests are those of shareholders or creditors,
and whether in either case the status has beerA acquired at the time of the
protested action, or not until shortly after the malefactions have been completed. It is in regard to this aspect of the problem that the most striking
shift in the Court's attitude is revealed.
It has already been pointed out that no creditors were involved in the
Lewisohn case. Imminently prospective shareholders were denied recovery.38 In the Furlaud case the bonds and notes were all distributed by
35. PA. CONST. (Purdon i93o) art. xvi, § 7.
36. Cf. Note (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. RE v. 661, 666, 667; Berle, Compensation of Bankers
and Pronoters Through Stock Profits (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 748.
37. For example, in a particular case the following additional factors may be important:
a. Time of promoter's subscripion. Did he subscribe before incorporation or after?
b. Degree of knowledge of other members of the association of the promoter's profits.
Will pre-incorporation subscribers be considered shareholders for this purpose?
c. Extent of promoter's control over the enterprise at the time the property was transferred to the corporation. Were there independent directors? Was the profit scheme executory or executed?
d. Degree of knowledge of those in control if promoters were not in control. How much
did the independent board know?
e. Characterstics or incidents of shares subscribed to by promoters. Par or no-par?
Voting or non-voting? Will the promoters always be protected if they receive no-par shares
in return for their property? Will the court value no-par shares at the average price the
public pays for the shares, or the price at which the promoters unload the shares on their
transferees?
f. Length of time between transfer of the property to the corporation by the promoters,
and suit against the promoters. Will laches or unreasonable delay preclude a recovery against
the promoters even though all the elements usually necessary for a recovery are present?
Will delay in instituting suit be taken to be evidence of shareholder's ratification of the promoter's conduct?
g. Character of the remedy sought. Rescission or damages? If the remedy of damages
is asked, what is the measure? For cases involving some of the above considerations, see
Beal v. Smith, 46 Cal. App. 271, 189 Pac. 341 (1920); Henderson v. Plymouth Oil Co., 16
Del. Ch. 347, 141 Atl. 197 (1928); Piggly Wiggly Delaware, Inc. v. Bartlett, 97 N. J. Eq.
469, 129 AtI. 413 (1925) ; Allenhurst Park Estates v. Smith, ioi N. J. Eq. 581, 138 Atl. 709
(1927) ; Pittsburgh Mining Co. v. Spooner, 74 Wis. 307, 42 N. W. 259 (1889) ; Erlanger v.
New Sombrero Phosphate Co., 3 App. Cas. 1218 (1878); Gluckstein v. Barnes, [igoo] A. C.
240.

38. A contrary result was reached in Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, I88 Mass.
Compare this case with a later Massachusetts case absolving pro315, 74 N. E. 653 (9o5).
moters for non-disclosure of profit to persons purchasing shares from them. Hays v. The
Georgian, Inc., 28o Mass. io, 181 N. E. 765 (1932), 85 A. L. R. 1262 (933), criticised by
Berle, supra note 36, at 756, 757.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Duquesne to Furlaud and Kingston before they reached the hands of the
public; hence the creditors acquired their status through transfers from the
promoting interests, and not through direct dealings with the corporation
issuing the securities. In the same sense that the shareholders in the
Lewisohn case were merely prospective at the time of the promoters' wrong,
the creditors in this later case may be described as prospective only at that
time. It is true that a case withholding protection from potential shareholders does not necessarily preclude granting protection to potential creditors. But there is a common factor in the two situations in that prospective
interests are involved. To consider such interests would have seemed to the
Court in the Lewisohn case to be "strictly legislative." '9 In the Furlaudcase
comes the announcement that "the interests affected by approval will shape
the power to approve", 40 and that the "assent" of those who are shareholders
at the time of the wrong cannot in all cases close the door of the courts to
those acquiring interests shortly thereafter. If any doubt lingered as to the
reversal of the Court's views, it was dispelled when Justice Cardozo stated:
"The shareholders were not at liberty, at all events to the prejudice of creditors or other shareholders,present or prospective, to set that policy at naught.

If the effect of what they did was to put illicit profits in the pockets of trustees, their consent will not avail to block pursuit and reclamation." 41
CONCLUSION

Whether the Supreme Court today would reach the same result if the
identical facts of Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn were presented
cannot, in view of the above consideration of the problem, be categorically
answered. But McCandless v. Furlaudmakes a very real contribution to the
problem of promoters' liability, even though it does not in all respects overrule the Lewisohn decision. For one thing, there is now a specific recognition from the highest tribunal that the interest of the community as a whole,
as set forth in a constitutional provision, is a factor of considerable import
in affixing the responsibility of promoters. And a more striking advance is
made in regard to the interests of prospective shareholders and creditors.
Under the Lewisohn case they were apparently doomed to complete disregard.
There is now an assurance that, at least in sufficiently compelling circumstances of promotional abuse, these interests will be given adequate judicial
protection.
M.P.R.
39. 210 U. S. 206, 215 (I98).
40. Instant case at 46.
41. Id. at 48. Italics added.

